No right to liberty: the detention of asylum seekers for administrative convenience
Helen O'Nions* Introduction: the climate of non-entrée
The recent decision of Grand Chamber of the ECtHR to endorse short periods of detention for asylum seekers on the grounds of practicality and administrative convenience appears to legitimise the indiscriminate and increasingly restrictive asylum policies of Western Europe 1 . The conclusion that necessity is not a requirement for detention in the asylum process may well lead to a dramatic increase in the number of people detained for comparatively short-periods. Such a practice is not accepted within the criminal justice sphere -thus a lesser standard applies when dealing with asylum detention, reflecting a view that asylum seekers are 'different' or 'others' whose human rights are limited by reason of their flight.
The reasons for the climate of restriction have been well-documented but should not be used to undermine the responsibility to provide sanctuary. Joseph Carens argues that there is a moral obligation which arises from the legitimacy of the nation-state system:
"the legitimacy of any particular state is thus initially derivative from the legitimacy of the system as a whole" 2 .
The nation-state system enables sovereign states to control their territory and exclude others; it is this process which generates refugees. As the nation seeks to firm up its identity those who do not fit neatly within that definition may find themselves excluded in a variety of ways. This obligation becomes greater as more refugees are created and does not diminish as the burden on the receiving state grows. Further, one can argue that once a state makes a decision to deny entry or expel a refugee they become implicitly linked to that person's destiny and become part of the causative chain. Even if one doubts any pre-existing moral responsibility to those who flee persecution, it could be argued that such an obligation must arise when a decision is made to deny entry or to remove.
Mathew Gibney argues for a more pragmatic obligation on states which recognises the demands of impartialists such as Carens but also understands that states have a duty to their own citizens and the political community that they inhabit. He reasons that there is a humanitarian obligation to those who constitute refugees which is owed to those in most need 3 . This obligation is not absolute as it depends on the ability of the host-state to accommodate those seeking protection.
Michael Waltzer argues that it may be necessary for states to restrict entry in order to maintain their own political community 4 .
In addition to any moral responsibility to admit refugees, which is certainly questioned by partialists, there is a legal right to seek and enjoy asylum enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a commensurate obligation to afford refugee status where a person complies with the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 5 .
Nevertheless, non-entrée measures are increasingly used to prevent asylum seekers from accessing this legal right. The tough stance taken in Australia which has been well-documented appears to be finding favour in the US and Europe as an increasing number of people are detained in the absence of evidence that they pose a danger or that they may abscond. According to Frank
Brennan:
Detention of asylum seekers without visas has been used to transmit a double signal -warning other asylum seekers to take a detour to another country and luring voters who wish to take a tough stand against the 'other''
6 .
Whilst the European detention estate is growing 7 it is also diversifying. Hathaway, identifies several states which avoid the use of prisons and dedicated immigration detention centres preferring to use reception centres to accommodate asylum applicants 8 . This is often a matter of semantics, for example in Denmark and Germany the reception centre stay is often compulsory.
In the Netherlands, asylum seekers are typically detained at these reception centres for the duration of their application. The government does not officially identify them as detention facilities as the occupants remain free to leave the country. Other states, such as Austria will deny support to asylum applicants who elect to reside outside the designated accommodation. In
Croatia, Law 109/2003 provides that an asylum seeker will be detained in the Centre for Asylum
Seekers during the duration of the application process unless they have sufficient resources to live independently in which case they will be detained for seven days 9 .
The Council of Europe's Committee on the Prevention of Torture suggest that conditions in these centres may be worse than those of prison establishments 10 . At the same time, several countries continue to use prisons to accommodate foreign nationals, including asylum applicants 11 . In the UK prisons may be used to detain immigration and asylum applicants despite UNHCR guidance that this should not occur. Officially the routine use of prisons ended following a government undertaking in October 2001 but it has been acknowledged that they will continue to be used in some cases where there may be a risk to security 12 . According to Home Office policy 13 who engage in disruptive activities whilst in detention may be transferred to prisons 14 . In Poland, asylum seekers can be detained in a specific detention facility or a deportation prison for up to a year if they have made an application whilst illegally in Poland or awaiting deportation 15 .In addition, private prison service operators now run many of the immigration detention centres in the UK . According to research by Christine Bacon, these companies see immigration detention as a logical extension of their role and clearly perceive their involvement as "firmly within the penal sphere" 16 .
The detention of asylum-seekers is normally justified in order to facilitate impending expulsion or where there is a concern that the individual may abscond. As such it is compatible with Article 5(1)f ECHR. However, recent times have seen a gradual departure from this justification to embrace detention for purely administrative purposes. As such the legal requirements to avoid arbitrariness and to act proportionately are threatened. The stage is being set for a move towards the Australian model of mandatory detention. In the UK, these moves began in the early 1990's with the Conservative government's perception that the country had become a 'soft-touch' for asylum seekers 17 . Similarly, the 1996 immigration reforms in the United States changed the direction of immigration policy in favour of increased restrictions and hostility by redefining persons who are not lawfully present as not yet admitted so as to deprive them of extended appeal rights 18 . Routine detention has recently been introduced against asylum-seekers arriving from a list of countries on the basis of generalised national security concerns 19 .
14 This was the case following the encouraged by these stricter regulations and the notion of immigration as 'potentially dangerous' which has helped to close off legal routes 38 .
The extended use of detention, whilst not strictly a non-entrée measure itself may appear to be part of a package of measures aimed at deterring asylum seekers from seeking refuge 39 . The typical rationale for detention in Europe has been to effect deportation or removal when the individual is not compliant 40 . This would appear to satisfy any concerns regarding necessity and proportionality. However, the recent move towards more routine use of detention may be viewed in part as deterrence-based. Such a rationale for detention is expressly prohibited by international law and one should expect to find that when detention is employed its use is restricted to situations where it is deemed to be 'necessary' and proportionate to the legitimate objectives (as prescribed by domestic and international law).
International law on the detention of asylum seekers
Although Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a right to seek asylum, it is clear from international human rights law that there is no right to enter a state or a right to be granted asylum. There are some limitations provided in terms of removals and the principle of non-refoulment but these provisions fall well short of any state obligation to recognise an individual as a refugee 41 .
In order to understand the nature of international obligations in this area it is necessary to consider both international refugee law and human rights law. On first glance, the international refugee law obligations may appear more demanding than those of international human rights law 51 as they specifically require necessity rather than simply a lack of arbitrariness 52 . Ultimately, such an assessment will depend on the interpretative reach of arbitrariness.
The concept of arbitrariness
The notion that detention should not be arbitrary is well rehearsed in international human rights 
…detention of asylum seekers may be considered arbitrary if: it is not in accordance with the law; if the law itself allows for arbitrary practices, or is enforced in an arbitrary way; when it is random or capricious or not accompanied by fair and efficient procedures for its review. It may also be arbitrary if it is disproportionate, or indefinite…For detention not to be arbitrary it should be prescribed by law that is sufficiently accessible and precise, and it should not include elements or inappropriateness or injustice 72 .
Furthermore, the Committee concluded, inter alia:
"Arbitrary detention of asylum-seekers and refugees occurs when they are detained for insufficient reason, without adequate analysis of their individual circumstances…" 73 .
In relation to Art 31(2), the expert roundtable organised by the UNHCR in Geneva 8-9 th Nov 2001confirmed the exceptional nature of detention and required individualised assessments: The UNHCR have also emphasised the need for the 'detaining authorities must assess a compelling need to detain that is based on the personal history of each asylum-seeker' 78 . This approach is also found in the C/E recommendation which requires that these cases are dealt with on their individual merits and that detention should be necessary in each case:
Measures of detention of asylum seekers should be applied only after a careful examination of the necessity in each individual case. Those measures should be specific, temporary and non-arbitrary and should be applied for the shortest possible time
and furthermore:
Alternative and non-custodial measures, feasible in the individual case, should be considered before resorting to measures of detention
79 .
The consideration of alternatives to detention is a recurrent theme in the international soft law 80 .
The UNHCR's Executive Committee has provided that the power to detain must be defined clearly and narrowly and that there should be an individual assessment of the suitability of detention with a consideration of the alternatives 81 . According to Ophelia Field, the consideration of non-custodial alternatives is a 'pre-requisite for satisfying the principle of necessity in relation to lawful detention' 82 . Arbitrariness may also occur where an applicant is denied adequate 77 1997 Comm 560/1993 3 rd Apr 1997 para 9.4, also discussed by Tootell, Hughes and Petrasek "The relevance of key UN instruments for detained asylum seekers" in Hughes and Liebaut supra n18 at189. 78 supra n81 at para 26(b). 79 C/E Recommendation Rec. (2003) 5 On measures of detention of asylum seekers para 6. 80 Although there is little hard law providing state obligations in this field. 81 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's programme "Detention of asylum-seekers and refugees: the framework, the problem and recommended practice" Standing Committee 15 th Meeting 4 th June 1999 EC/49/SC/CRP.13 para 14. 82 Field supra n26 para 70.
reasons for the detention, this obligation is continuous in that the detention may become unlawful if the reason given initially ceases to apply 83 .
Thus, according to international soft law, for a decision to satisfy the absence of arbitrariness test, it should be based on the individual circumstances of the applicant and should proceed from a consideration of alternatives which are found to be inappropriate in the applicant's case.
Article 5 ECHR contains the presumption of liberty and any interference must be for one of the specific purposes only. The detention must be lawful in that it is prescribed by law, complies with the rule of law and it should avoid arbitrariness 84 . In the cases of Amuur v France and Shamsa v Poland a lack of clarity regarding the process of detention violated the requirements that the procedure was prescribed by law 85 .
Generally, the exceptions to Article 5 are narrowly construed by the Strasbourg authorities. The
ECtHR has insisted that effective and regular judicial supervision is a key element of detention in the criminal justice process. In Brogan v UK 86 , the detention of terrorism suspects for periods of four and seven days was held to breach the requirement for suspects to be bought promptly before a judicial authority 87 . It is also clear that there must be reasonable grounds for suspicion before a person can be detained. Similarly if a person of 'unsound mind' is to be detained there must be a medical assessment of necessity to ascertain that the person is suffering from a mental illness 88 .
The need to consider all the alternatives to detention has been emphasised by the ECtHR in Litwa The right to liberty is limited by Article 5(1)f which allows detention in two situations i) to prevent the person from unauthorised entry into the UK ii) where an action of removal is to be affected. In the latter scenario, it has been clear since the decision of the ECtHR in Chahal v UK that detention does not need to be 'necessary' although it is also clear that detention can only be justified if the removal proceedings are in progress and are being processed with due diligence 92 . The use of generalised assessments of safety is relevant to the debate on detention, as it may be a chief factor in the decision to detain following the designation of the case as clearly unfounded 104 .
Recent developments in the EU
Art 27 requires states to ensure an individual case by case assessment of safety of particular states but in fact member states are able to develop their own approaches on this question and it specifically permits national designation 105 . In addition, Article 29 empowers the European
Council to draw up a list of safe countries of origin; member states are expected to deem those countries as safe and may add to but not subtract from this list. Annex II provides the criteria '…it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Art 9'.
The generalised approach of the directive is certainly problematic in the light of the prohibition on non-refoulement. In particular there is concern that it may result in refugees in orbit or 'chain refoulement' 106 .
In 1995, the Commission issued a proposal for a new directive on common standards and procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 107 . The proposal is directed at ensuring speedy removal from the European area and includes provision for a European re-entry ban. Article 14 endorses temporary custody but only where 'there are serious grounds for believing that there is a risk of absconding' and where less coercive measures can not be applied.
Temporary custody is subject to judicial supervision but may be extended to a max of 6 months 108 . Whilst it is envisaged that such custody will be in specialised detention facilities, there 104 Young supra n17 at45 criticises the UK's designation of Nigeria as 'safe' after the murder of the Ogoni In the UK, detention centres were renamed reception and removal centres in the Nationality, Whilst the objectives of the law governing immigration detention may be clear, such as the need to prevent absconding and thereby effect removal, the decision-making process itself is insufficiently prescriptive and there is a lack of statutory regulation. There is clearly a lack of transparency evidenced by an absence of specific data. It is not known how many immigration detainees are still accommodated in prisons and data on the number of child detainees is difficult to obtain 131 . Whilst the Home Office's website provides some of the data it only provides a snapshot on a particular day and av
Given the absence of specific data on the number of people detained and the length and grounds for the detention, the UN Working G "national authorities should provide detailed information on relevant policy, practice and statistics in order to ensure transparency" 132 .
The reasons for the decision to detain should be given in writing at the time of detention and thereafter at monthly intervals. According to rule 9 of the Detention Centre Rules of April 2001,more detailed written reasons are to be given to detainees at monthly intervals. However, it would appear that this decision is often presented as a list of ticked boxes
Research by BID suggests that the vast majority of detainees had not been given information consistent with the criteria in the OEM 134 .
127 Home Office Asylum statistics 1 st quarter 2007 emphasised in research by Weber and Gelsthorpe which suggests that there had been a goal-shift re was a reason to assume that they may not comply with the conditions of their process claims quickly and efficiently 143 . Detainees have access to onsite legal many incidents of racism, physical abuse and incompetence amongst the employees of Global from the published reasons justifying detention to that of deterrence 141 .
The Oakington regime
The Home Office policy published in 1998 provided that persons liable to be detained under schedule 2, para 16 (1) and 2(1) Immigration Act 1971 were initially to be detained only to clarify the nature of their claim and ascertain their identity. Thereafter they were temporarily admitted unless the temporary admission. From March 2000, the policy was changed in relation to detention at Oakington reception centre which had been established in order to process certain applications speedily.
It was envisaged that most people detained at Oakington reception centre would be detained for around 7 days. Indeed, the Minister responsible assured the House of Commons that applicants whose cases were not determined within a period of 'around 7 days' should be granted temporary admission or moved to another place of detention 142 . According to Ian Martin, Oakington Project
Manager, the rationale of Oakington was not centred on the prevention of absconding but rather on the need to advice and services unlike many other detention facilities where access to legal advice is often a major difficulty 144 . The weekly cost of detention at Oakington in 2002 was calculated to be £1620 The limited period of detention at Oakington may be followed by temporary admission. However, it may also result in detention at an alternative institution and thus it is important to regard
Oakington as one element in the system of immigration detention rather than a separate, specific institution dealing only with fast-track applications. In theory, detainees have been sifted before arrival, yet it is alleged that this is not happening and people who are victims of torture, rape and trauma who require detailed psychological evaluation are not receiving it 150 .
The presumption underlying detention at Oakington is that applicants can be fast tracked with a The reasoning employed in Saadi demands great scrutiny as it confirms a distinction suggested in 
If necessity for detention is to be shown, it is more appropriate to require it for someone who has been nd detained with a view to deportation because of his conduct here than for someone who has recently landed and who has never been lawfully here under authorised entry
161 the application of the non-discrimination provision in Article 14. unlawful entry as they had applied for asylum as soon as the opportunity availed itself. In immigration control. Lord Slynn's approach can be contrasted with that of Justice Collins in the High Court who reasoned that if the applica the authorities and did not present a risk of misbehaviour, he could in no way be regarded as effecting unauthorised entry 160 .
lawfully here and who is then arrested a
The HL declined to consider However, they did find a breach of Article 5(2) as Dr Saadi was not informed of the reason for his detention for a period of 76 hours.
The decision of the ECtHR
Saadi is the first case where the meaning of 'unauthorised entry' is debated at length by the In applying these factors to Dr Saadi's detention, it was found that the authorities had acted with good faith in order to speedily process the aplication and that this purpose of detentionwas closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised detention. Under the third criteria, the conditions at Oakington were considered to give no particular cause for concern 167 . This separation of arbitrariness from necessity leads to a false dichotomy; as Liberty have recognised:
The The Grand Chamber's interpretation also seems at odds with th illegal entrant whose status has been regularised is lawfully within the state for the purpose Liberty and submission to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR Para 5. Article 12 171 . Ophelia Field contends that this must apply equally to an asylum seeker who has been admitted to the asylum process 172 . Thus she observes a paradox whereby a person's presence may be simultaneously lawful and yet, according to the ECtHR in Saadi, unauthorised.
In this respect international human rights law, particularly Articles 9 and 12 ICCPR, appear to offer greater protection to that of regional protection. Unfortunately, neither provision was given ulkes, Kovler, Hajiyev, Spielmann and Hirvelä articular they note the danger of assimilating asylum seekers to ordinary immigrants which sits at odds with the interpretation that asylum seekers are lawfully within the state's territory under Article 12 ICCPR.
They also doubt whether the fast-track detention process complies with the requirement of 'good faith'. In particular they criticise the line of reasoning which suggests that the fast-track system is in the best interest of the asylum applicants:
…to maintain that detention is in the interests of the person concerned appears to us an exceedingly n the end justify the means: no person, no human being may be used echo the opinions of the earlier dissenting Judges Casadevall, Traja and Šikuta in that the ajority interpretation of unauthorised entry creates great uncertainty for all asylum applicants that have not received specific authorisation on entry; they may be liable to detention at any time.
sential part of the assessment process in international soft law.In The ruling in Saadi can be limited to the specific process of detention at Oakington and other fasttrack processing centres. The confinement was considered neither arbitrary nor disproportionate given its limited duration and the conditions of the detention. Lord Slynn reasoned:
if conditions in the centre were less acceptable than doubt but it seems to me that the need for speed justif they are taken to be there might be more room for ied detention for a short period in acceptable physical conditions as being reasonably necessary 175 .
However, it is contended that if requirements of necessity and proportionality are not strictly applied to immigration detention, as they are with other restrictions on movement, states might be encouraged to extend the use of detention which would not need to be justified 176 . It seems a big leap to say that because detention under Article 5(1)f does not need to be strictly 'necessary', it can be undertaken for administrative convenience. Such an argument could lead to an exponential increase in short-term detention across Europe.
Allowing administrative convenience to justify any deprivation of liberty, albeit defined as 'shortterm', seems to be a very dangerous precedent. Liberty has argued that neither administrative convenience nor a short duration of detention can be used to satisfy the requirement that detention is not arbitrary 177 designed to meet the objective should be rationally connected to it; and iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom should be no more than necessary to accomplish this objective. The legitimate objective is the provision of immigration control and the use of detention is connected to this objective so it becomes particularly important to focus on the third element which must involve a consideration of the length and conditions of detention.
Detention conditions
It is important that the length of detention and the conditions of detention should be separated in As well as constituting a ships and loss of social status 200 . This disengagement is fuelled by lack of regular information about process. The detainee will experience temporal and spatial disorientation as well as grief and anxiety -which leads to a
As the applicant had claimed asylum immediately on arrival in the UK it would suggest that she had been detained purely on account of her illegal entry and notwithstanding evidence of torture.
Pourgourides discusses several cases which provide an indication of the mental health effects of detention on asylum seekers. One Algerian man had been imprisoned on arrival in the UK despite evidence that he had been severely tortured when imprisoned for five months in Algeria. He had also been subjected to a short period in solitary confinement 197 . This experience had increased his anxiety and depression and led him to have suicidal thoughts.
The degree of anxiety is often intensified as people don't know precisely why they have been sense of nothingness and uncertainty and, ultimately a feeling of overwhelming powerlessness and insignificance 201 . These feelings will intensify the longer a person is detained and thus is that detention is a last resort which is confined to short periods where less challenging environment for the potential becomes essential to ensure necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective. In advocating an integrationist approach, Watters also notes the detrimental mental health effect of detention 202 .
In the assessment of proportionality it is essential that these factors are fully appreciated before a decision to detain can be legitimately made.
Alternatives to detention
Whilst there is little research on the alternatives to detention in the UK there has been detailed research analysing the international position by Ophelia Field and Alice Edwards 203 . They point out the lack of data regarding non-detained asylum seekers who abscond which makes it difficult to assess whether there is a significant risk which could justify a detention policy 204 . However, the research also suggests that in destination states, asylum seekers are unlikely to abscond as they seek to be recognised as legitimate, lawful residents 205 . A study of 98 asylum seekers who were released on bail contrary to the wishes of the HO who believed they had a high chance of absconding found 90% maintained the bail conditions 206 . The evidence collated indicates that the provision of legal advice and support is likely to significantly reduce the potential to abscond 207 .
The research demonstrates a wide range of potential alternatives which could be utilised by the state to maintain the objective of immigration control and security -the majority are likely to be detainee. In particular, the only state-funded bail system -the Toronto bail programme which supports those with no community ties to raise bail monies would appear to offer an effective alternative in destination countries. Bail is only offered following an assessment and interview to scertain the client's credibility and the program then operates a regular reporting mechanism in ECtHR in Saadi rules that necessity is not a requirement for immigration detention 212 . a addition to offering legal advice and support 209 .
Field concludes that research is urgently needed on the question of absconding and alternatives to detention within the UK 210 . It is submitted that any solutions should seek to avoid further criminalisation of asylum seekers.
Necessity: an essential component of proportionality?
Ten-day detention without charge is not generally acceptable in the criminal justice process 211 .
Detention on the grounds of mental illness is also narrowly defined and can only be legitimate on the basis of necessity i.e. when the person is suffering from a mental illness. Yet, the decision of the HL and Thus, it is apparent that asylum seekers have less of a claim to liberty than others. The judicial supervision found throughout the criminal justice process is considered by the EctHR to be unsuitable in the immigration context. This separation of necessity from arbitrariness and proportionality is a cause for concern as it is not possible to conceive of these concepts in isolation.
Fairness requires outcomes which are accurate, efficient and acceptable 213 . Whilst acknowledging that errors may occur in any system it is important that the margin of error is minimal. An error would surely occur if, as in one of the cases presented by Amnesty International, a torturesurvivor is detained on arrival in the absence of any particular concern that they would abscond or a.
uspicion that a person may be connected with terrorist offences. clear that it must not be arbitrary and that this includes an assessment of proportionality. It is submitted that a deprivation of liberty in the absence of an individual assessment of its appropriateness or need, does not satisfy these requirements.
Detention can only be considered to be proportionate if it is rationally connected to the legitimate objective of immigration control. This is doubtful if we take a narrow view of immigration control and associate it with preventing the risk of absconding and illegal activities. However, as the ECtHR appears to afford a wide margin of appreciation to states to determine what immigration control requires, we may expect them to allow a broad interpretation on this point.
Nevertheless, proportionality also requires an assessment that the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than necessary to accomplish this objective. Thus we can see that necessity is not entirely irrelevant in the decision to restrict movement or deprive a person of their liberty. At the very least we would expect a consideration of alternatives to detention in the individual case, an individualised assessment of the need for detention and the health effects of detention. Amnesty International has described the decision to detain in the UK as a 'bed-lottery' hich is arbitrary in that it lacks considerations of necessity and proportionality 217 . This includes ntly based on the risk of absconding but where Amnesty found that detained Conclusion w cases appare applicants had complied with all requests from the authorities 218 . As it is impossible to understand why some people are detained and not others with similar case histories, the conclusion must be that it is for deterrent purposes -apart from an increased vulnerability to detention of certain nationalities, the process appears arbitrary 219 .
If there is concern over bogus asylum applications and the need to prevent abuse then we must acknowledge that non-entrée policies operate in an indiscriminate manner. Furthermore, non-217 Amnesty International supra n153 at 49. 218 ibid. at 52.
arrival measures lock refugees to their region of origin which are also the regions with the largest number of refugees and the greatest refugee burden -therefore they act to 'cement existing injustices' 220 .
The UNHCR has been critical of the trend, particularly post Sept 11 th 2001, to detain asylum seekers sometimes on a discriminatory basis depending primarily on country of origin 221 . They also emphasise that the necessary public support for the reception of asylum seekers has been hampered by the media and politicians tendency to conflate illegal migration with refugee movements 222 . The UNHCR return to this theme in the 2003 report which notes that despite the public sense of panic over illegal migration, the number of asylum applications had fallen the previous year in industrialised countries 223 . This pattern has since continued 224 .
Whilst the numbers of people detained on immigration grounds is increasing across Europe, its use has become less targeted 225 . If left unchecked it seems likely that more states will opt for administrative detention and as the number of detainees increases so will the duration of the confinement. The consequences of this development should not be under-stated. More people will be locked up for longer periods 226 . This is reprehensible on both an individual and societal level.
For some, detention itself will be traumatic and for others it will add to the trauma of persecution already experienced. In either event, it is unlikely to assist integration should the detainee be awarded refugee status. On a societal level, it furthers the perception of non-EU immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees as 'different' and Outsiders 227 . In so-doing it fuels intolerance and racism. Asylum seekers are increasingly portrayed in the British media as 'undeserving' and the expansion of the detention estate has helped to fuel this view. Landgren argues that the increased use of detention 'enhances the perception that there is something amiss with that group of people.
It contributes to animosity towards asylum seekers as a whole' 228 .
A brief period of detention may be viewed as a practical solution to the demands of immigration control 229 . It could also be argued that where there is no previous history of torture or trauma, a brief period of confinement may be proportionate and acceptable. However, this conclusion ignores the legal, social, moral and financial objections that can be levied at short-term detention.
iew that asylum seekers are anitarian obligation owed to those so defer to the rule of law which requires any deprivation of Legally, detention in the absence of an individualised assessment of its suitability, is on shaky ground. International soft law requires both a consideration of alternatives prior to detention and that a decision be based on both necessity and proportionality.
Socially, the routine use of short-term detention, perpetuates the v criminals. As noted by the dissenting judgements of the Grand Chamber and the UNHCR, the terms immigrant and asylum seeker are becoming blurred 230 . This causes confusion and increases hostility as the latter t becomes misunderstood and marginalised 231 .
Morally, if one accepts Gibney's contention that there is a hum fleeing persecution 232 , it is surely inappropriate to subject those people to detention where it is not strictly necessary. One could al liberty to be based on narrowly prescribed, accessible criteria.
Financially, the cost of immigration detention far exceeds the economic cost of allowing a person to live freely in the community. There are no signs that the climate of restrictionism will abate in the near future. In 2007, the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office published their strategy to build stronger international alliances to manage migration 233 . The strategy includes increased off-shore border circumstances. Saadi was detained because of his Iraqi nationality and a ion for administrative purposes does not satisfy the tests of proportionality checks, much more emphasis on preventing abuse and controlling entry as well as a protection quota of up to 500 people year -surely an embarrassment given the number of people in need of protection and the rate of emigration from the UK.
The ECtHR were keen to emphasise the requirement that detention should not be arbitrary. Yet arbitrariness, which includes a test of proportionality, must surely require an individualised assessment of necessity. It also demands a consideration of alternative, less intrusive, measures.
The detention of Dr Saadi can not be viewed as necessary to verify his identity as he had consistently maintained contact with the Home Office and thus it is difficult to see the justification for detention. It certainly does not appear to be based on an individual assessment of his particular presumption, which turned out to be inaccurate, that his case could be speedily determined.
Therefore a consideration of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 5 may have been more appropriate.
The ECtHR in Amuur recognised that while states may be legitimately concerned over immigration and attempts to evade immigration control this cannot be used to legitimise the denial of rights to asylum seekers as guaranteed by international refugee and humanitarian law 234 .
Yet the decision in Saadi effectively endorses such a denial providing it is for a short period of time.The use of detent and lack of arbitrariness. It is also entirely at odds with the view of the UNHCR that detention 
